The plaintiff, the City of East Cleveland (CEC) enacted a housing ordinance that limited the occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance narrowly defined the term “family” as encompassing only a few categories of related individuals. The ordinance particularly restricted those who can live within a single household to members of an immediate nuclear family.
Appellant and also defendant, Mrs. Inez Moore, lived in an East Cleveland home with her son, Dale Sr. and her two grandsons (Dale Jr. and John, who came to live in later). The two grandsons were first cousins rather than brothers, with one of the grandsons moving in with his appellant after his mother’s death. Under the housing ordinance, this arrangement…show more content… But it expressly allowed those who were related by blood, marriage, or adoption to live together. The freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The Supreme Court recognized that there is a fundamental right to keep a family together. And that definition of “family” includes extended families such as Moore and…show more content… While these are legitimate goals, the statute serves them only marginally because large groups of people can still live together so long as they meet the statutory definition of a single family. The city also tries to distinguish this case from other precedent that has provided for constitutional protection of family rights by suggesting that such rights extend only to the nuclear family. This Court finds that the force and rationale of these precedents are applicable in the present case. A valid family under the statute might have twelve children while there are only two in question in the case
