It is shown that if a ritual involves a costly signal of commitment to the group, members who signal more intensely are more cooperative towards others, and receive more support (Soler, 2012). For example, members of the Ache of Paraguay who shared more resources with others in periods of strength, also received more food from people when they were hurt or sick than individuals who were less generous (Gurven et al., 2000). Additionally, display signals among the Yomut Turkmen of northern Iran help secure trade agreements as they display a strong commitment of Islam to others, and this helps facilitate business (Irons, 2001). This evidence suggests having other members owe you for generosity and sacrificial acts can act as protection in times of trouble, and strengthen bonds and alliances between members. However, those who need to benefit from the group the most should also be those who are displaying or partaking in the most costly signals. This not only includes those in need of financial or social benefits, but also depends on individual circumstances. For example, among the Camdombles of Brazil, new religious members may be more inclined to prove their loyalty and alliance, while those who have relatives in the same group or have been longstanding members may need to signal less as they already have support in the community (Soler, 2012). Although some argue costly rituals exist simply to gain rewards in a later life, by strengthening cooperation within groups, they can bring immediate benefits (Lavrič & Flere, 2010). Therefore, religious behaviours have been favoured by selection to benefit the individual because they are able to form alliances, promote greater group stability and aid in protection by associating oneself with others (Hayden,