The fact that the plant was elevated to the height of ten meters above the sea level suggests that the exposure to those hazards was recognized at the design stage. However, the 3.1 meters high protecting wall was designed basing on limited historical records of tsunami waves. By 2011, however, more data was collected and experts expressed strong recommendations for fundamental upgrades. None was implemented (IAEA 2001; WNA). In contrast to such management shortsightedness or rather criminal negligence, Fukushima II plant management had in fact followed the recommendations and successfully waterproofed the backup power system that even covered by flooding water continued the cooling and prevented core damage (TEPCO, 2011).
As in TMI and Chernobyl, the Fukushima disaster response was greatly undermined by a number of factors. First, the initial attempts to manage the situation were primitively barehanded. The staff at the plant was not properly equipped, therefore, unprotected against high radiation levels. Lack of proper personnel training for such an emergency was evident as emergency instructions and procedures were not followed. Japan, a leader in robotics, ended up having no dedicated remotely operated robotic equipment to relieve people from exposure to high radiation, and many plant workers had to risk their lives and