Since God, as omniscient, predestines or foresees some but not all men to salvation, would he not predestine those men remaining to damnation as a logical consequence? “Just as an unchangeable God unchangeably predestined, even before the creation of the world, all his elect…to eternal life, so the same unchangeable God by his just judgement unchangeably predestined all the reprobates…to everlasting death.” By logical (not theological) necessity, just as God elects some men to salvation, he must by consequence reject some men from salvation. As Gottschalk argues, all salvation is based upon the will and judgement of God, and since biblical literature forewarns the salvation of the few, some men must be predestined for eternal death. If salvation is in the election of God and not all men are elect from eternity, would that not mean that there are some non-elect who will not be saved? Would not God know those whom he has not elected to salvation? In this respect, Gottschalk argues that to deny the predestination of the damned is to deny and place a limit on the knowledge of God. Thus, double predestination, as Gottschalk explains, is not a premise but a consequence. To reject double predestination is to reject the logical conclusions and implications of divine …show more content…
In order to be perfectly just, God must not only produce judgment on those who are saved but also on those who are damned: “the same unchangeable God by his just judgment unchangeably predestined all the reprobates…” [emphasis added]. As Eriugena points out, “The penalty for sin is death; God did not make death; therefore he did not make the penalty.” Gottschalk argues, however, that this diminishes God’s justice as void and inapplicable. God, in order to be truly just, has to render judgment on all of humanity not just on those whom he has predestined to save. In this respect, double predestination is a logical consequence of divine justice. In electing those who are predestined for eternal salvation, he simultaneously passes over those whom he does not predestine. Thus, Gottschalk argues for double predestination in order to preserve the concept of God as perfectly