In a scenario where new information comes out that boxing matches cause larger amounts of harm to the boxers would the state be justified in interfering and banning the boxing when all the sports fans and the boxers do not want it banned? No they are not. Under Mill’s logic it is clearly paternalistic and unjustifiable and even under Smiley, who has a broader view of paternalism, it is not even readily clear that it is not paternalistic.
Does Mill see this as paternalistic and justifiable?
Mill lays out the harm principle as a principle that guides whether state legislation is appropriate in a scenario and adds as a clarification to it the idea of the self-regarding sphere. If it can be shown to break it then mill would not view the legislation…show more content… Let’s even assume that some form of harm is actually caused to someone who is not involved in the boxing match (through medical costs say). Well, then there are better options that do not restrict the freedom of those involved as much. The state could mandate that better equipment be worn. Yes this would still be an infringement on the self-regarding sphere but not nearly as much as an outright ban. Or the state could increase education to dissuade future generations from going into boxing unsafely. These ideas are actionable seeing as in the modern world the idea of bare knuckle boxing is almost synonymous with manly men with twirled mustaches engaging in fisticuffs riding off afterwards on one of those bikes with the huge front wheels. It is feasible to make modern boxing seem as ridiculous and outdated as that form of boxing without banning it.
As to Smiley’s logic the main problem I have with it is how big the group has to be. If the group is too large as my reading of Smiley seems to have it being then there really is no protection against the tyranny of the majority. If everyone is “involved” then anything put forward in a democratic way is self-imposed, applies to all and, in most cases, does not expand state
