Plan XVII previously called for an invasion in which “French troops attack[ed] through Belgium”; however, it did not go as planned because Joffre was “unwilling to violate that nation’s neutrality” (Hickman). Respecting Belgian neutrality, Joffre did not want them embroiled in France’s conflict. Instead, he decided to send troops to “concentrate along the German border and mount attacks through the Ardennes and into Lorraine”: a two-pronged attack (Hickman). Reverence may have been one of Joffre’s strengths; however, Joffre was “not a man of enormous knowledge” (Stokesbury 31). Moreover, his ultimate blunder in his war plan was “thinking the Germans had far fewer troops than they were actually able to mobilize”. (Stokesbury 31). The success of the Allied forces was contingent on Germany “sending at least twenty divisions to the Eastern front as well as not immediately activating their reserves” (Hickman). Circumstances did not work out because “Belgian fortresses fell more quickly than expected” (Hickman). Consequently, the reformed French Plan XVII came toe-to-toe with the Schlieffen Plan, a German war plan that “was formulated in its essentials by 1895”, many years prior to the conflict (Stokesbury