Richard Kagan v. Harley Davidson, Inc.
Buying a Harley Davidson Sportster from his stepson, Adam Martin included receiving a service manual upon delivery which included a caveat: the Sportster had been possessed by seven individuals preceding Richard’s purchase, it had been pilfered but returned, and there were no calamities reported. Provided to Kagan were precautions in the form of a service manual; he was instructed to withdraw the jiffy stand prior to riding; if it is not fully retracted during operation, the rider may be distracted with unexpected contact of the road surface. Upon contact, the jiffy stand may retract causing …show more content…
Arguing that "there is no issue as to any material fact" Compass believed they were eligible to receive interest, attorney's fees, and the cost of the loan.
Granting Compass Bank a security interest for a 2007 Harley Davidson XL 1200C, Boughner repudiated turning over the motorcycle when he shirked the note. Additionally a defendant in the case, was Jesse Hays, co-signer of the Harley Davidson motorcycle; Hays was granted a dismissal without prejudice and Boughner represented himself in court. Attorney Shawn K. Brady of Messer, Campbell and Brady in Frisco represented the …show more content…
In this empirical paper the role incomplete information plays in an econometric model of drunk driving deterrence is explored. Little evidence is found that people know the applicable laws in their states. However, some evidence of rational behaviour is found given their lack of knowledge of these laws. It is di cult to reconcile these results with studies that have found drunk driving deterrence eŒects of more severe penalties, more certain penalties, or even swifter penalties. Traffic acccidents are a leading cause of death in the USA and alcohol is involved in nearly half of al fatal accidents (Perrine et al., 1989). According to (Kenkel & Koch 2001), someone who is poorly informed and misjudges the expected penalty for driving drunk may make poor decisions. For example, consider a person who would drive drunk if the probability of punishment is one in a thousand. The appellees in this case appeared to have had an invincible mentality upon deciding to maneuver and handle a motorcycle. The appellees could have prevented this accident perhaps if they were fully aware of the