The literal rule is very easy for a judge to apply. The literal rule simply means that judges should apply the ordinary, natural meaning of the words used in the statute. It is supported by those judges who say the role of a judge is to apply what parliament says; not try and guess what they meant.
In R v Judge of the City of London (1892), Lord Esher MR said that if the words of the Act are clear, the court must follow them even though they may lead to a manifest absurdity.
The golden rule says that if the literal rule produces an absurdity, the court should look for another meaning of the words that avoids the absurd result. This may be in two situations
The words in a statute are ambiguous and could be interpreted in two different ways. (The narrow approach)
The words in a statute have only one meaning but to give them that meaning would be completely unacceptable. (The wide approach)
The narrow approach is where a statutory provision is capable of more than one literal meaning and leads the judge to select the meaning which avoids absurdity. Then the wide approach is where the words of a statute are quite clear and only have one meaning. However, to give them that meaning would lead to an absurd or repugnant result or a result which is contrary to the intentions of parliament.
An example of the literal rule is in the case of London & North Eastern Railway v Berriman (1946) this is where the claimant’s husband had been maintaining railway