M. Therese Lysaught explores an ethically complicated medical case in a Catholic hospital in Phoenix, Arizona, St. Joseph's Hospital and Medical Center. The thesis of this paper is that, in light of the details of this case provided below, M. Therese Lysaught judged that the actions of the hospital in this situation did not classify as a direct abortion. M. Therese Lysaught defends argument through in five ways. First, she cites the magisterial teaching embodied by Catholic Healthcare West, and supports her argument with teachings of magisterial documents. Second, she analyzes the moral object of the action through the works of St. Thomas in his Summa Theologica. Third, she explores the principle of double effect and how the case presented…show more content… Fourth, she draws upon the work of leading Catholic scholars, Martin Rhonheimer and Germain Grisez to justify her claims. Finally, she evaluates the Bishop's ruling and refutes opposing arguments made by the National Catholic Bioethics Center. A 27 year-old women went to St. Joseph's because her pulmonary hypertension was worsening. Pulmonary hypertension is an incurable disease that can become progressively worse. It is a type of high blood pressure that results in restricted flow of blood to the lungs and the ride side of the heart, and it forces the heart to work harder to pump blood, which can result in the weakening of the heart and heart failure. Pulmonary hypertension is complicated by pregnancy, as pregnancy causes increased blood volume, increased cardiac output, and decreased systolic blood pressure. A pregnancy test revealed she was seven and a half weeks pregnant. Though doctors told her that, due to the severity of her condition, there was roughly a 50% chance she would die, the woman still opted to keep the pregnancy. At 11 weeks, the woman returned to the…show more content… The principle of double effect can be used in morally complicated situations to determine if a good action with a bad effect is morally permissible. The act must be morally good or neutral, the intention must be only to achieve the good effect, though the bad effect can be forseen, the bad effect must not be a means by which one achieves the good effect, and the good effect must be equivalent to or greater than the bad effect. These three examples are as follows: The surgical removal of a fallopian tube containing a fetus, the surgical removal of a cancerous uterus containing a fetus, and the administration of chemo or another medicine that will kill the fetus but treat the mother's own condition. (Lysaught 543). The Committee on Doctrine does not consider these actions “direct abortions” and does not even refer to them as abortions at all; they fall under a different category because they have a different moral object—saving the mother's life. While none of these cases describe exactly the Phoenix scenario, they are similar and show that while direct abortion is forbidden and there are no exceptions, there are other cases that deserve to be considered as a different type of action and are not considered direct
