Nussbaum’s view of emotions is that they are judgements, which is strongly correlated to our sensory perceptions, and system of beliefs. She groups the possibilities of beliefs, and perceived objects that can cause an emotion in to four possible categories, as necessary, sufficient, or constituent (as fully, or in other parts). However, she rejects that perceptions and judgements are necessary, sufficient, or constituent (of other parts) to cause an emotion. Rather, Nussbaum focuses that belief and perceptions are wholly constituent to the emotion. Within this paper, I will analyze, and explain her argument on why our perception, and beliefs are constituent causes of an emotion, whereas there are not sufficient, necessary or constituent of…show more content… For Nussbaum states that external beliefs, and perceptions alone cannot be a necessary cause for something that is not a belief (190). The ‘thing’ that is not a belief is the emotional position, which is our evaluative judgement upon the object we perceive. Additionally, it’s not necessary that we must perceive something to cause an emotion. For we can form beliefs without visually, or audibly perceiving an evaluative object. Rather, we can cognitively interpret an evaluative property, such as a dwelling on a sad, or happy thought. This is the same for sufficient causes, because emotions cannot be wholly caused by external, or internal factors (190). Consequently, emotions cannot be necessary, or sufficient upon our perceptions and beliefs, because this would overlook the cognitive elements that essential to causing, and identifying the emotion…show more content… Because, what we perceive, or believe is the objects that is being evaluated, which is used to explain why our emotions are a form of judgement. Nussbaum explains this as the neo-stoic form that our judgement is an assent to the proposed object, or belief (191). For the assent is where we accept the belief, or perceive an object as true, which greatly impacts the individual, and causes the emotion. Moreover, whenever we feel a certain emotion, it is because we have accepted an evaluative proposition to be true (193). These propositions can either be instantaneous, or require perceptual evidence to cause the assent. However, once the assent happens, the emotion acts as our judgement upon the object we perceive. In effect, this rules out the third possibility that there can be ‘other’ constituent elements in causing an emotion. Rather, the evaluative judgement that is the emotion is constituent to our beliefs, and/or
