Operation Anaconda Research Paper

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Pages: 5

Operation Anaconda, a major US and allied Afghan operation, began early on the cold winter morning of 02 March 2002. The main objective of this joint operation was to destroy or capture al Qaeda insurgents occupying the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan. According to the senior leaders of Anaconda, the operation was a success but, it did not develop according to plan. One could argue that the operation was a failure from the start. If not for a rapid and radical shift in the warfighting on the ground and in the sky, it very well could have been a failure. Lack of competence during planning left the force ill-prepared and lack of mutual trust between forces disrupted mission execution but, the disciplined initiative of leaders on ground …show more content…
The overall battle plan was to use the “Hammer and Anvil” tactic. The “hammer” in this tactic is the use of a direct-action force meant to assault through the Shahikot valley upon the enemy, killing or capturing them. The “Anvil” was a series of seven strategically placed units in blocking positions to keep the enemy from fleeing through the eastern side of the valley. Overall, it was a seemingly sound plan. After all, intelligence reports were estimating an enemy force of 200-300 combatants spread amongst the four villages in the valley. This force, however, was grossly underestimated. In fact, there were upwards of a thousand combatants with most of them occupying defensive positions in the mountains with heavy machine guns and mortars. This is where the shortcomings in competence begin. Due to these low estimates and the Pentagon’s desire to keep American presence in Afghanistan capped at 10,000 troops, General Hagenbeck and staff were stuck with a force almost entirely made up of light …show more content…
This was, after all, the first time the ground forces utilized the Air Force for wide-area fires alongside precision strikes. Wide-area fires typically have the role of artillery and since there was no artillery support, air support had to take that role. After ironing out the CAS processes, the dominance from the sky debilitated the enemy’s ability to defend the valley. After ten days most enemy combatants were killed or had fled the valley and “mopping up” operations commenced to bring the operation to fruition. What had been planned as a three-day ground assault, finally came to an end as a successful, 16 day long, onslaught from the sky. This led to the Department of Defense enhancing joint coordination between ground and air forces in the planning stages of operations. Operation Anaconda immediately failed to an extent. During planning, competence, or lack thereof, put the success of the operation on a tightrope. Poor planning then led to a complete breakdown of strategy at the very beginning when the main assault force lost trust in both command and mission. This certainly shows a significant level of failure; however, the mission was still a