Patrice Brown
Kenneth Maddox
Business Ethics MGMT 368
10 February 2015
The Ford Pinto Case The Ford Pinto Case was a very infamous moment in Ford’s history. At that time, Ford was struggling to keep up with the ever rising imports of Japanese auto manufacturers that were being produced and sold at a rate that was light years ahead of the industry. In order to remain relevant, Ford had to come up with a way out and they had to do it fast. Their solution, the Ford Pinto, an automobile that was great on gas, easy to yield, and could be sold at an astoundingly low price. Ford’s answer to the automobile market demands rest heavily on the success of the Ford Pinto. They did not have much time to produce an automobile that was both good on gas and economical. This is validated when they speak of the fact that they only had “25 months rather than the usual 43 months for a new automobile line” (DeGeorge 298). At times, we all find ourselves in a bind each and every day, with choices that can only hang in the balance for a split second. In doing this, we force ourselves to take shortcuts to reach the end result. I personally believe this to be true more than often than not if we reflect upon these moments in our own lives. This is no different than the case of Ford’s production of the Pinto model. During the assembly of automobiles, they go through a chain of stages beginning with model development. After model development, and prior to the automobile being released on the market place, they must withstand a series of assessments to make sure the automobile meets and is in accordance with all motor safety rules and regulations. Ford on the other hand, did not follow protocol and they instead released the automobile without the testing of rear-end impact. In fact, Ford did not even test the rear end until after the production of the automobile was finished. In the testing of the rear end Ford found that the rear-end impact failed in accordance with standard safety procedures. In the discoveries of production Ford “placed the fuel tank such that if the automobile was hit from the rear at a speed above 20 miles per hour, it would be punctured by a bolt from the bumper and could possibly burst into flame” (DeGeorge 298). Ford later found “that if a baffle (estimated at costing between $6.65 and $11) were placed between the bumper and the gas tank, the Pinto would be equivalent to other automobiles of its class with respect to the danger of fire from rear-end impact” (DeGeorge 298). Ford Pinto sales increased rapidly even with the current problem. In fact, “Ford did not change the design from 1971 to 1978” (DeGeorge 299). Ford consumers were happy with the product that they were receiving and Ford Motor Company was content to have a product that was continuing growth in the product life cycle. Problems still began to rise though, “between 1976 and 1977 alone, Pintos suffered 13 fiery rear-end collisions which was more than double the number for comparable-size automobiles” (DeGeorge 299). Consumers that purchased a Pinto or passengers who rode in this automobile were significantly compromised by the shortage of testing on the part of Ford. At the time, Ford Motor Company business was good, for consumers, the automobile fulfilled their needs. On the other hand, one must ask was the risk worth the reward, I feel Ford would say perhaps and consumers who didn’t suffer any consequences would also say yes. Ford was producing an automobile that was retailing at an alarming rate, which they believed overshadowed the penalties which were the identified complications of the rear-end impact. Ford’s key concern was producing an automobile that could keep up with the sub-compact automobile race that American automobile producers found themselves in the late 60’s and 70’s. Ford continued the sale of the Pinto until 1978, “when it was finally recalled to have the baffle inserted” (DeGeorge 299). Nonetheless, Ford Pinto sales never saw a drop due
