There was simply no court in the colonies in the seventeenth century with the proper jurisdiction to try pirates. For the colonies to actively pursue the crown’s aggressive anti-piracy policies, the question of jurisdiction in piracy trials had to be resolved with landmark legislation. To that end, the British Parliament passed An Act for the more effectual Suppression of Piracy, also known as the Piracy Act of 1700. Although it conferred significant authority to local courts, its range was limited to the colonies. This was a reflection of the crown’s growing understanding of piracy’s evolving nature and the difficulties in bringing suspects to justice under the existing laws. “All Piracies, Felonies, and Robberies committed in or upon the Sea…” replaced the vague language “Treasons, Felonies, Robberies, Murthers, and Confederates upon the Sea,” imbedded in the 1536 Act.” The inclusion of the term ‘piracy,’ a first in English law, reflects the idea that piracy was no longer a general term for a series of crimes committed at Sea, but a crime in and of itself. It also widened the definition of piracy beyond the archaic robbery at sea interpretation. The 1700 Piracy Act made several maritime actions piracy, including; a captain who ran away with his …show more content…
He incorporated both his personal views of the proper way to try pirates, and elements of the Treason Trials Act (1696), into the new statute. Anyone in the courtroom for the trial of Joseph Dawson and the rest of Every’s crew in 1696 would have recognized similarities between the proceedings of that trial, in which Hedges presided as president of the court, and the legislation he drafted months later. Chief among his personal preferences for prosecuting pirates was to convict harshly and ask for the sovereign’s mercy. This aligned with the traditional method of dealing with common felons under English law. In his opening address to the grand jury, Hedges expands on this belief, “If a jury happens in these cases to be too severe, there is room for Mercy, and I am confident, that upon a just representation, the Innocent never failed of obtaining it; but for a fault, neglect, or errour on the other hand, there is no relief for injured