There is a difference between dualism (traditional/substance), property dualism, double aspect theory. When it comes to mind-body problem, Searle’s assertion might not be that contradictory to the hand-out.
Searle asserts on p. 6 that using the traditional jargon we may say property dualism is compatible with complete physicalism. Between the lines we see that Searle is already against that. He supposes we should not insist on using the traditional jargon anyway.
Also, he is very careful in identifying the dualism he’s been talking about as property dualism (when it comes to consciousness, this means accepting the existence of consciousness but not as a separate subject, rather a property of the brain) and it is compatible with physicalism considering the view that there are many higher level properties in which intrinsic mental properties are just one.
This might seem still as contradictory, but on p. 8 and 9 we find more insight on how Searle envisions the Functionalists and Dualists. For him, the Functionalists generally are known to say mental states are just brain states, physical activities of the brain create the states. On the other hand, he goes on to explain that, most of the time, these theorists take a further step and end up in denying the existence of intrinsic features of the world. On the other hand, the Dualists, “mentalists” as…show more content… In a different paper (“Why I Am Not a Property Dualist”), he clarifies “dual aspect” theories are not good examples of the traditional dualist approach. * And he is right, because as Text 24 puts it, dual aspect theory is different than the traditionalist approach. While the dualists hold that the domain of consciousness is mind and no subject is a body, in double aspect theory mind and body both contribute to the subject of consciousness, and since it is this subject that is essential, neither mental nor physical is prior to each
