The proof for 1p5 argues that if two substances shared an attribute, they would not be distinguishable and would therefore be identical. The proof, then, turns on the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). Many scholars have observed 1p5 seems to apply only to substances of one attribute. While this proof holds decently for such substances, Leibniz rightly observed, that Spinoza elsewhere explicitly argues for substances of multiple attributes. The natural question, then, is whether this proposition holds for substances of multiple attributes as well as it holds for those of just one attribute. Leibniz proposed considering two substances, substance A and substance B, such that A had attributes X and Y and B had attributes Y and Z. Then they would share an attribute but would still be discernible by the unshared attributes; by PII, they would still be distinct substances and thus 1p5 fails to