Tomasi promotes a “hybrid theory” of mixing both classic liberal and high liberals to create a concept he calls “market democracy” (Tomasi, 50). Tomasi is presenting for a liberal conception of government, where there is a “thick conception of liberties” (Tomasi, 57). He uses multiple philosophers on the side of classic liberals and high liberals to present his points about why economic liberties are basic. Tomasi believes that this use of both theories will promote a form of economy that will use the market’s “spontaneous order” from classic liberals Hayek to achieve social goals presented by high liberals such as Rawls. Tomasi claims economic liberties should be protected as they involve “a general right to independent activity and decision…show more content… He believes that they can be divided up into liberties of “working and owning” (Tomasi, 54). He explains these in the high liberal and classic liberal ideology describing both the thin and thick protections of economic liberties. Tomasi makes a moral claim as to why economic liberties are basic, comparing them to other basic rights that people have in liberal democracies to show why economic liberties should also be considered basic. He asserts that liberal democracies fall under the idea of “coercion,” where the people have consented and have a contract “written or unwritten” to base this coercion as being justified or not (Tomasi, 64, 65). To assess these ideas, people must first develop their “moral powers,” to which Tomasi sees two. The first moral power is self authorship, and the second is the recognition of other citizens as also self authors. Tomasi sees “the role of basic liberties” as protecting those two powers in liberal democracies (Tomasi, 66). Tomasi presents basic liberties as “those liberties that must be protected if citizens are to develop their evaluative horizons” and draws comparisons with the economic liberties that high liberals and classic liberals allow for and how they should not be able to exclude the others (Tomasi, 66). Tomasi charges Rawls and other high liberals with “economic exceptionalism” and specifically constraining economic liberties. Tomasi points out that high liberals do not have a true claim to economic exceptionalism, but mostly critiques of a thick conception of economic liberties. He first addresses the critique from Murphy and Nagel stating that property rights are “legal convention” believing that you cannot define a right by the system in which it is held (Tomasi, 61). Tomasi shuts down this critique by presenting multiple points that conflict with this idea, such as “bodily integrity”
