Smyrl argues that other than the 1859 Gubernatorial election, the Unionist never gained dominance from the electorate in Texas. He contributes the success in the 1859 election to “Houston’s personal popularity and Runnels’ poor record of frontier defense.” However, immediately following the election of Houston, Unionist lost supporters as news of John Brown’s raid reached Texas, where throughout the South, Southerners linked abolitionism to Unionism. Smyrl argues that support for Unionism shifted throughout Texas counties in the 1850s elections and the secession referendum. Supporting his assertions by presenting election returns for eighty-three counties and charts “the centers of true Unionist sentiment.” He outlines forty-three Southern counties that gave a higher percentage of votes to Fillmore in 1856, but lower percentage to Bell in 1860, and they “strongly favored secession in 1861.” Also, presenting twenty-nine counties giving a higher percentage of votes to Fillmore and Bell’s election, and voted a higher percentage against secession. Finally, he presents eleven counties that gave lower percentages of votes to Fillmore and Bell, but a higher percentage opposing secession. Smyrl cites the reason for not voting earlier for secession revolves around the German immigrants who disliked the Unionist early attachment to the Know Nothing Party, which possessed an anti-Catholic platform during the 1856 election. The shifting of allegiance throughout this voting cycle provides at least one answer as to why Unionist failed to achieve dominance in Texas that resulted in a three to one vote for