Weisman V. Alabama Case Summary

Alexander V. Bernard Current: Iowa City, Iowa (480) 580-9558 alexander-bernard@uiowa.edu WRITING SAMPLE MEMORANDUM TO: Senior Attorney FROM: Alexander Bernard RE: Weisman Burglary Matter DATE: October 3, 2023 QUESTION PRESENTED. Under Alabama’s burglary statute, 13A-7-7, does Miriam Weisman have absolute authority to enter her apartment as an occupant after a four-day absence following the termination of a pre-marital relationship with the co-occupant? BRIEF ANSWER I. Likely, yes. Alabama cases have defined absolute authority as an entry by a person who is an occupant of the habitable structure who has not been absent from it for an unjustified period, or if the person entering has an ongoing marital relationship with a co-occupant. Although …show more content…
Ala. Code 13 A-7-7 (2021). This memorandum will examine whether Miriam Weisman had a right to enter her apartment with absolute authority in the context of Alabama’s burglary statute. Gauze v. State, 542 So. 2d. 1365 (Ala. 1975). I. The court will likely find that Miriam Weisman had an absolute right to enter the apartment in the context of Alabama’s burglary statute, 13A-7-7. Weisman will likely prevail as Alabama’s burglary statute provides that a lawful entry must be with “authority”. Ala. Code 13A-7-7. Authority can be absolute if the enterer is an occupant that has not been absent for an unjustified period or has a marital 3 relationship with a co-occupant. Sears v State, 500 So. 2d 938 (Ala. 1972); Gauze, 542 So. 2d. 1365. The court’s evaluation of Weisman’s occupancy and absence rests on her inhabitation of the apartment and her absence’s persuasive weight, respectively. Weisman will be unable to satisfy the marital relationship element of absolute authority. A person may claim absolute authority based on marriage unless the marital status of the co-occupant occupying the home has ended. Sears, 500. …show more content…
Weisman’s claim of occupancy will likely prevail under Alabama’s burglary 81 statute. In Gauze, the defendant was an occupant of the apartment. His 82 occupancy, not his ownership, was the focus of the court’s decision to reverse his 83 burglary judgment. Similarly, Weisman entered not as an owner, but as an occupant 84 after inhabiting the apartment for two years. She was never expelled from the space, 85 never claimed she was moving out, temporarily left with “some” stuff, and eventually 86 returned four days later. A court denying her authority would be contrary to the purpose 87 of the statute that sought to dissuade intruders, not inhabitants. 88 Furthermore, a four-day absence will likely not preclude an absolute authority claim. In Caufield, the defendant’s two-week absence was unpersuasive rather than a 90 persuasive absence of a “few days”. Weisman was away for four days, was never 91 expelled, and never verbalized her intent to move out. Generally, four days could reasonably be understood as a “few days.” In Davenport and Sears, defendants moved 93 out, were absent for two months, and had their re-entry conditioned on permission. 94. Weisman’s re-entry was unconditioned, and a four-day absence is strikingly shorter than 95 two

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