Before World War II Vietnam was the colony of Indochina, which at the final stage of the war was occupied by Japan. After a final defeat and capitulation of Japan in 1945, the power vacuum appeared in Vietnam (Smith 2014). Taking advantage of the wartime devastation, …show more content…
It appeared to be impossible to persuade France that it shouldn’t withdraw from Vietnam; meanwhile, the USSR and the PRC were able to convince the Vietnamese government in Hanoi to abandon the idea of annexing Laos and Cambodia and take a moderate position. The result of the conference was the decision to create a temporary demarcation line on the 17th parallel, which will cease to exist after the general elections for the single Vietnamese government (Young et al., 2013). Given the high popularity of Communists in the country it was clear for the US that they would win the elections and gain control over the united Vietnam. Despite the condition that Vietnam would not enter any military alliance, the situation was not perceived as admissible by the US. Therefore, after the negotiations on Vietnam had ended, the United States declared that they did not consider themselves obliged to comply with these agreements, despite the fact that they unilaterally pledged not to violate them (Hull, 1970). However, it could be argued that even then it was obvious that having refused to recognize The Geneva Accords, the US had unleashed its hands for further action. In addition, the American delegation made another important proviso, according to which the United States had the right to take any further steps that they deemed necessary. In fact, by this reservation, the American …show more content…
At the same time, the general situation was exacerbated in other states of Southeast Asia, as an active domestic political struggle began in Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos and Cambodia. Particularly acute was the situation in Laos and Cambodia as they were located in the vicinity of Vietnam and for which the government of North Vietnam and the PRC had definite plans. These factors caused commotion in the US, military staff of which evaluated the events in Vietnam in the context of political confrontation with the USSR and its allies (Record, 1998). The abovementioned situation contributed to the formation of a "domino effect" theory within the administration of President Eisenhower. According to the theory, it was enough for one state of the region to become a communist to push all others follow its example. From this point of view, the US position in East Asia was already threatened by the formation of the PRC, which, for fear of the American leadership, could drag Vietnam along with it. In turn, the establishment of communist Vietnam could have led to the victory of the Communists in Laos and Cambodia, which could be followed by Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, the political situation in which was already far from stable. Thus, according to this theory, it was of fundamental importance for the United States to prevent the victory of the Communists in