This essay is a response to two chapters from Challenges of Modern Sport to Ethics: From Doping to Cyborgs by Perez Triviño and aims to examine an ethical sub-issue regarding transhumans in sport – compromising athlete autonomy. Autonomy, as defined by Kahn (1997), is “the indeterminability of the individual with respect to external human will” (Kahn, 119). Using the ethical framework of deontology this essay will outline what types of transhumans compromise athlete autonomy and in which scope of sport this is applicable. Triviño identifies three areas of transhumans, gene doping, cyborgs, and genetically modified, hybrid, and chimera athletes. Of the regulatory problems regarding transhumans Triviño categorizes them into three main areas:…show more content… Here Triviño emphasizes largely on the unknown of scientific enhancements currently, and the lack of information regarding the potential adverse effects or ergogenic benefits of such treatments. Schneider and Rupert state that there are three broad categories of potential risk to gene therapy. First, complications resulting from the action of the gene, second, unanticipated complications to the method of gene transfer, and third, unanticipated secondary consequences of the transgene function (Schneider & Rupert, 2009). They argue that “athletes cannot make an informed decision” (Schneider & Rupert, 196) because there is no information and the athlete is not informed fully on the risk versus reward ratio. However, if the information simply does not exist, and athletes are fully disclosed to this, their autonomy must still be respected. To deny them the opportunity to make the decision for themselves in order to prevent a potential unknown harm is unjustified paternalism (Triviño, 2013). In regards to germ-line modification, there are also potential implications for future generations that cannot be predicted, and these implications may not be fully identifiable for several generations (Culbertson, 2009). Arguably this undermines the autonomy of those generations that are not capable of deciding their own fate and which they become subject to the long-term effects of genetic enhancement. This replacement of natural selection with a deliberate selection presents several questions regarding who can legitimately make genetic choices concerning future generations (Culbertson, 2009 & Bostrom, 2003). Regarding germ-line enhancements the argument of autonomy has been seen both ways. Parents may choose not to give their children any enhancements, and those children would then have diminished opportunities through no choice of their own (Bostrom, 2003). In order to prevent this we would have to
