Jackson did not likely make a false and fraudulent claim of her age. She did not read the documents that made reference to her age when purchasing the car. This does not constitute fraud, since she is a minor. Jackson also made no verbal claims as to her age. Any misrepresentation was unintentional, and therefore, not fraudulent.
The law “imposes no duty on a minor to read a contract . . . ,” and the failure to do so does not constitute “actual fraud.” Woodall v. Grant & Co., 9 S.E.2d 95, 95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1940). However, a defendant cannot avoid a contract “upon the ground of his minority at the time the agreement was made . . .” if the plaintiff acted on “the false and fraudulent representation of the defendant with respect to his apparent…show more content… 9 S.E.2d at 95-96. It was undisputed that the minor plaintiff did not read the prerequisite contract he signed prior to engaging in business with the defendants. Id. at 95. By signing the contract, he unknowingly claimed to be at least twenty-one years old. Id. The court held that a minor does not bear the responsibility of reading a contract as an adult would. Id. Neglecting to do so did not constitute “actual fraud,” because it was an unintentional misrepresentation attributable to his minority.…show more content… In Carney, the minor plaintiff sought to recover money he had paid on a car loan. 88 S.E.2d at 806. He acquired the loan by telling the agent that he was twenty-two, when he was actually nineteen years old. Id. at 808. The agent filled out paperwork according to the age the minor provided, which he then signed. Id. The court held that intentional deception precluded a minor from avoiding his contract based on minority. Id. Similarly, in Clemons, the minor plaintiff was also estopped from avoiding a balance due on an account with a clothing store, because he obtained the credit by fraudulently stating his age. 187 S.E. at 713. The court’s reference to Jones gave additional context to support that estoppel only applies to minors when a claim was “made with a view to deceive.” Id. (quoting Jones, 74 S.E. at 52). Both cases emphasized the plaintiffs’ intentional deception as the reason they remained bound to their contracts.
