In overhearing a child shouting “you’re dead meat” to a sibling that they are chasing --or when someone flippantly says “they’re dead to me” in reference to an ex-lover, would you fear an oncoming passion-murder? Can this be a probable cause for danger? I would not anticipate any harm to come of either statement. These are the judgement calls made by members of the public every day. However, psychologists are required to determine if such vernacular --that which is common in society-- is a cry for legitimate concern? If a woman expressed …show more content…
Would it be “reasonable” to hold the psychologist liable for this?
In addition to relying on this punishable clinical judgement, I believe that the Supreme Court in Tarasoff was unclear of any threshold that would indicate when a psychologist should breach their client’s confidentiality. This has provided uncertainty that comes detriment of psychologists and their practices. Members of the American Psychological Association (APA) cite confidentiality as their most frequently described dilemma (Pope & Vetter, 1992). Guidelines for psychologists on what action they should take are also not established. In the Court’s words:
The discharge of this duty may require the therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending on the nature of the case. Thus, it may call for him to warn the intended victim of the danger, to notify the police or to take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances. The matter thus is one which depends upon the circumstances of each case. (Macbeth et al., 1994, p. …show more content…
County of Alameda, the court temporarily released a juvenile offender into the custody of his mother (1980). The juvenile allegedly had “latent, extremely dangerous and violent propensities regarding young children” --even threatening to “kill a neighborhood child if released”-- which led to a reasonable conclusion that a repeat offense was likely to result of releasing the offender into the community. The offender “almost immediately...sexually assaulted and murdered a 5 year old boy.” The professionals who determined the offender was fit for release were not liable. Rather, threats were not specific enough and professional decisions were not based on open dialogue in the same way as a therapeutic relationship. Additionally, the court ruled there to be no duty to warn the public or local authorities of the criminal offender even though the offender would pose a threat to the community. Here, the court rationalized it to be the duty of the public to bear the cost (1980). As it concerns this case, the duty to warn is seemingly subjectively opposed in the rehabilitation of convicted offenders. Such interpretation of the duty to warn varies across the