Background
The pilot had been recently instrument rated and was familiar with his aircraft. He also had previous experience flying into Jackson Hole. Weather had precluded a Sunday …show more content…
Jackson Hole is surrounded by mountains and the mountaintops were reported to him as obscured and with the freezing level between 7 and 10,000 feet, a high likelihood of icing existed (NTSB, 2012). The weather at the airport was changing rapidly. At 0851, it was 2 miles in mist and overcast at 1,100 feet. Fourteen minutes later, it was 5 miles visibility with light snow and a 4,100 foot ceiling. At 0953, the airport had visual flight rule conditions only to be followed by 4 miles visibility with snow and a broken ceiling at 1,500 feet (NTSB, 2012). The pilot must have been looking out the window thinking he could make it during one of the intermittent higher ceiling periods, but if so, he was failing to consider terrain. By the time the pilot had gotten to his plane and was taxiing, the wind was reported as 11 gusting to 17 knots with one mile visibility in light snow and a broken cloud layer at 1,000 feet (NTSB, 2012). Clearly, this was going to be an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight, without the benefit of visual conditions. Although the pilot had logged 23 hours of instrument time, of that total only one hour of it was in actual instrument meteorological conditions. The pilot may have been legal to file and fly IFR, but his decision to "go" in light of the rapidly changing …show more content…
Both the sectional and the IFR chart should have given the pilot cause for concern in regards to terrain. Adapted from Skyvector. (2015). Flight plan added: JAC - KICNI - RIW. Retrieved from www.skyvector.com
Only the week prior, the pilot's flight instructor had advised precautions for operations within mountainous terrain, yet the pilot apparently failed to notice the minimum safe altitudes along his route of flight (Neary, 2013a). With only a two-position oxygen system available and four persons onboard, icing in the area, and obscured mountaintops, the pilot should have known that he was near the upper limit of his ability to provide safe transit for his passengers.
ATC's Complicity
There were at least four FAA employees who might have caused the pilot to re-think his 'go' decision. First, clearance delivery or ground control or the tower might have influenced the pilot's decision by re-iterating the forecast, or by clarifying the route and altitude requested and then assigned, or by restating the current and rapidly changing weather conditions. The pilot had planned for a northerly departure. He had filed twice for an altitude below the MEA (NTSB, 2013). A well placed comment or question might have caused the pilot to