Suitability of Formal Law Enforcement in Conflicting Crime As stated by Ashbel, Wall, and Tracey, “The primary mission of law enforcement is to maintain peace and order and provide a safe environment” (Ashbel, Wall, and Tracey 1). In addition, law enforcement experts have the mandate of providing a safe habitation for everyone. All domains in law enforcement have their own roles, which have interconnections regarding their primary motive-providing public safety. Harvey Wiener in his chapter 5 introduction article put it, “Yet, to judge by the current events, it seems that many people in America see the government as an evil to be avoided rather than an avenue for sustaining life in a just world” (Wiener 161). This raises the question whether the law enforcement practices are fair to people over whom it has jurisdiction. This shows that law, despite the fact that its enforcement is vital, some elements in its practice leave questions regarding its suitability. It therefore becomes the main objective of this paper to determine the validity of these arguments. Elrich and Brower state, “Increased punishment for offenders culminates to a substantial reduction in crime frequency” (Elrich and Brower 99). As such, there is an increased risk with regard to victimization due to the practical private law enforcement. In addition, the protection measures severity increase, which is associated with the increase in scope of the prevention variables. In everyone’s knowledge, it is universally agreed that punishment prevents crime, and as Elrich and Brower put it, “There are three possible reasons that act as a punishment’s causal interpretations” (Elrich and Brower 99). One of them is punishment as a prevention variable in preventing crime, as a disincentive of any criminal activity. This makes the entire practice of law enforcement vague and difficult to understand, especially pertaining to its efficiency and functionality. In the recent past, the application of the so-called ‘Economics of Crime’ in the United States has been on the rise. As Frey states, “Assume that a lot of punishment prevents crime” (Frey 92). It is vital to comprehend that punishment is substantively effective even when not applied. According to the economics of crime, punishment mechanisms serve as signals to show what kind of behavior is both morally and legally undesired by the lawmakers. Expressive punishment procedures therefore reveal that they are the only possible actions to apply when it becomes difficult to impose other types of punishment. The second component is the mechanism of humiliating the offenders. This entails the strategies whereby offenders are actively exposed to the public. Consequently, their reputation is diminished. The accompanying distrust is very negative for the perpetrators, instigating dishonor, especially in their profession. The other mechanisms revolve around crushing the perpetrator, for example confronting the victims, usually targets psychic effects. For example, a killer of a father can be forced to share the experience of any immense loss suffered by the children and the widow. Offering of lower wages is also one of the measures. This makes the perpetrators more socially withdrawn. The other component advocates that under no circumstances can crime be tolerated. This is based on the alleged broken window theory. In this, even the perpetrators of the somewhat insignificant misdemeanors must be severely punished in the quest to discourage the public from deviating from the law. Others support life imprisonment after a perpetrator commits two minor offences. To the government side, it might be that if a perpetrator gets a punishment of the same level as that of a major crime, he may tend to commit the most significant ones. It therefore raises the question whether the system is fair enough, or whether it aids in committing big crimes. In an anthology called Campus Climate Control by