Marc Lynch

Words: 1430
Pages: 6

In “Why Engage?: China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement”, Marc Lynch, a professor of Political Science at George Washington University, receiving his BA from Duke University and his MA and PhD from Cornell, describes the best method of how the United States should handle the “paper tiger” of the South Pacific (Lynch Biography). Currently, the United States holds a ‘containment strategy’ as its foreign policy towards the rising power, much like its dogma towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This policy is rooted in what is called ‘realism’ in the study of international relations. Realism is the belief that states will always act within their own self-interest; that relations are in a zero-sum game in which countries are focused …show more content…
and China, indeed, the Taiwan Strait Crisis under the Clinton administration in 1996 and the current conflicts in the South and East China seas are proving this claim. Even in dialogue, the strategic mistrust between the two states is at an extraordinary high, with the U.S. pointing to human rights agreements and the Chinese pointing at the U.S.’s failed record at keeping its military agreements (Lynch 191). Second, Lynch argues that there is a diplomatic difference between ‘strategic’ and ‘communicative’ action, i.e. that ‘communicative’ action relies on states “…treating the other as an equal participant” whereas ‘strategic’ relies on “…treating the other as an object to be manipulated…” (Lynch 192). He then asserts that publicity is key to have substantial change in power relations, writing “privacy keeps talk cheap…private talks may not allow [states] credibly to reveal their own preferences…or to learn those of other states…[they] allow for more straightforward application of power and self-interested trade-offs…since [states] forgo the need…for…rational argument and moral justification” …show more content…
One critique is the lack of in-text citations, especially for strong claims like “…when engagement followed a more communicative logic, it has been more successful in achieving its avowed goals…”, but I think that this is easily countered by the fact that the article comes with over three pages of citations, all coming from other experts in international relations and from some sort of university press (Lynch 197). Another critique of the article is that it is rather dated, with some of the information coming from 1976. This is a rather substantial issue, where there is a whole new administration, the developments from the Obama’s “Asia Pivot”, and six more years of the Bush administration after the publication of this article. I may not use this article for its empirics, but instead its theory, and through further research I can prove the theory’s relevance in Sino-U.S. relations. Take for instance, not much has changed in policy. The United States is still containing China, and we will likely continue to do so under the Trump administration. Our fundamental realism will likely evolve into classical realism and the United States will then be riding the fast track to fall under the conflict spiral; the world will likely see a “great power” within the next decade. But, I digress, for I have not considered the interdependencies between the two Pacific rivals, e.g. the economy. Perhaps another critique of this proponent